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RESTORATIVE JUSTICE, EUTHANASIA, AND ASSISTED SUICIDE:
A NEW ARENA FOR RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND A NEW PATH
FOR END OF LIFE LAW AND POLICY IN CANADA
JENNIFER J. LLEWELLYN* AND JOCELYN DOWNIE"
This article examines the current Canadian legal
approach to euthanasia and assisted suicide,
highlights some of the problems with it, and offers a
novel alternative to the current traditionally
criminalized prohibitive regime. The authors first
describe a restorativejustice approach and explain the
differences between such an approach and the
traditional approach currently in use. They then
explain how a restorative justice approach could be
implemented in the arena of assisted death,
acknowledging the potential challenges in
implementation. The authors conclude that taking a
restorativejustice approach to euthanasia and assisted
suicide could enable movement in the seemingly
intractable public policy debates about these issues,
lead to more effective and compassionate responses to
cases of euthanasia and assisted suicide, and prompt
policy and practice reform that enables society to
better care for individuals at the end of life.

Cet article examine I'approche juridique
canadienne actuelle a I 'egard de I 'euthanasie et du
suicide assiste, en souligne certains problemes et
propose une alternative unique au regime traditionnel
prohibitif et criminalise qui existe aujourd'hui. Les
auteurs commencent par decrire une approche de
justice reparatrice et expliquent les differences entre
cette approche et I'approche traditionnelle qui est
actuellement en vigueur. Us expliquent ensuite de
quelle maniere une approche reparatrice pourrait etre
mise en place dans le domaine de la mart assistee, tout
en etant tenant compte de problemes eventuels de mise
en ceuvre. Les auteurs concluent que I'approche
reparatrice a I'egard de 1'euthanasie et du suicide
assiste pourrait donner un certain jeu dans le debat
public a ce sujet, debat qui semble insoluble en
apparence, et pourrait mener a des reactions plus
efftcaces etplus compatissantes aux cas d'euthanasie
et de suicide assiste et amorcer une reforme politique
et pratique permettant a la societe de prendre mieux
soins auxpersonnes en fin de vie.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Passions run high whenever the issue of society's response to euthanasia and assisted
suicide is raised. Dialogue turns into debate and conversation turns into conflict. At fairly
regular intervals, public discourse flares as a controversial case hits the media or politicians
attempt to confront the public policy challenges that the issue creates. The names of Sue
Rodriguez and Robert Latimer are familiar to most Canadians as, under the glare of the
media spotlight, their cases worked their way up through the court system until each reached
the Supreme Court of Canada.1 When a Special Committee of the Senate of Canada released
a report on assisted death in Canada2 and when Irwin Cotler (then Minister of Justice)
subsequently raised the possibility of initiating a public consideration of the issue, sparks
flew.3 When the Quebec National Assembly actually engaged in a public consultation,4 the
issue heated up again. And yet, despite these periodic flares, little if any progress has been
made in resolving the deep controversy over the appropriate public policy stance with respect
to euthanasia and assisted suicide in Canada. The issue is raised and people quickly take up
their entrenched positions and rehearse long held arguments for or against the
decriminalization of euthanasia and assisted suicide. A strong majority of Canadians have
for decades supported decriminalization.5 Yet for decades federal politicians (the only ones
with jurisdiction to proactively change the Criminal Code6), presumably fearing single issue
right-to-life voters, have steered well clear of the issue. The question then arises — are we
doomed to repeat the cycle of the issue being brought forward, an acrimonious debate
ensuing, and ultimately no progress being made? Or is there another possible path?
In this article, we suggest that restorative justice might provide a new direction and a new
way to resolve some of the myriad problems associated with the current approach taken to
euthanasia and assisted suicide in Canada. To that end, we first describe the way euthanasia
and assisted suicide are currently handled by the legal system in Canada. We then describe
restorative justice and highlight some of the differences, both in substance and process,
Rodriguezv.BritishColumbia(A.G.),[l993]3S.C.R.5l9;R.v.Latimer,2001 SCC 1,[2001] 1 S.C.R.
3 [Latimer].
The Special Senate Committee on Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide, Of Life and Death — Final Report
(Ottawa: Special Committee on Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide, 1995), online: Senate of Canada
<http://www.parl.gc.ca/common/Committee_SenRep.asp?Language=E&Parl=35&Ses=l&comm_id=6>.
Janice Tibbetts, "Cotler envisions law legalizing assisted suicide" National Post (3 November 2005) A5.
Quebec National Assembly, "Select Committee on Dying with Dignity," online: Quebec National
Assembly <http://www.assnat.qc.ca/en/travaux-parlementaires/commissions/csmd-39-l/index.html>.
Ipsos News Center,News Release, "Canadians' Views on Euthanasia" (6 November 1997), online: Ipsos
News Center <http://www.ipsos-na.com/news/pressrelease.cfm?id=878>: "[W]hether a person who is
terminally ill and wants to die before enduring the full course of the disease, should have the right to take
their own life"; Canadian Press/Leger Marketing, How Canadians Perceive Euthanasia: Executive
Report (Montreal: Leger Marketing, 2001) at 5, online: Leger Marketing <http://www.leger
marketing.com/documents/SPCLM/010702ENG.pdf>: "In your personal opinion, should someone who
has helped to die a member of his close family suffering from an incurable illness causing extreme pain
be prosecuted?"; Ipsos News Center, News Release, "As Dr. Kevorkian Released, Just One Quarter
(25%) Believe Doctor-Assisted Suicide Should Be Illegal" (10 June 2007), online: Ipsos News Center
<http://www.ipsos-na.com/news/pressrelease.cfm?id=3526>; "Most Quebecers back legal euthanasia:
poll" CBCNews (22 November 2010), online: CBC News <http://www.cbc.ca/canada/montreal/story/
2010/11 /22/quebec-euthanasia-poll.html>.
R.S.C. 1985,c. C-46.

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2103608
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between the traditional approach currently in use and the proposed restorative approach. We
follow this with an explanation of how a restorative justice approach could actually be
implemented, while flagging important challenges in doing so. In the end, we conclude that
taking a restorative justice approach to euthanasia and assisted suicide in Canada could
enable movement in the seemingly intractable debate, and the adoption of a more effective
and compassionate response to extraordinarily difficult situations.
II. THE CURRENT APPROACH TO EUTHANASIA AND ASSISTED SUICIDE
At present, euthanasia and assisted suicide are clearly prohibited under the Criminal
Code.1 Euthanasia is murder, and a conviction for murder carries a mandatory minimum life
sentence with no possibility of parole for ten (for second degree murder) or 25 years (for first
degree murder).8 Motive is irrelevant to the assessment of guilt, and consent to the act is no
defence.9 While suicide itself is not a crime, counselling, aiding, and abetting someone else
to commit suicide is, and a conviction for this crime can bring a sentence of up to 14 years
in jail.10 Again, as with euthanasia, motive is irrelevant and consent is no defence.
Under the current approach to euthanasia and assisted suicide, the focus is on the
individual who committed the act and they are "a suspect" before charges are laid, "the
accused" once charged, and "an offender" or "criminal" once convicted. The person who
died is considered a "victim." A victim, according to the Criminal Code, is "a person to
whom harm was done or who suffered physical or emotional loss as a result of the
commission of the offence."11 In the investigation, charging, and trial stages of the process,
there is no scope for considering the wishes of the individual who died or the circumstances
in which the request for euthanasia or assistance with suicide were made. Was the deceased
imminently dying in intractable pain? Was the deceased a ten-year-old or a 50-year-old? Was
the accused motivated by compassion or malice? Had society provided ready access to
quality palliative care and home care support services, or was the deceased living in a rural
community with no respite care and no health care providers for hundreds of miles? In the
sentencing stage, the impact upon the deceased and those surrounding them (for example,
their family) can be considered. For assisted suicide this can have profound implications as
there is no mandatory minimum sentence. However, for euthanasia it can only affect the
length of time to be served before the possibility of parole above the mandatory minima. A
consideration of the impact on others is very limited and certainly does not extend beyond
those close to the "victim." Thus, the current approach polari/es the parties (the person who
died and the accused) and limits the range of those included in the process (directly, the state
and the accused; indirectly, the deceased; and even more indirectly those close to the
deceased),12 It takes into account neither the wishes of the person who died nor the complex
web of factors that led to their decision to seek assistance in dying. It ignores society's
responsibilities with respect to end of life care. It stigmatizes the person who provides the
assistance and victimizes the person who sought death.

Ibid., s. 229.
Ibid., s. 745.
Ibid., s. 14.
Ibid.,s. 241(b).
Ibid., s.722(4).
Such perspectives are typically only considered as part of victim impact statements tendered during thi
sentencing process.
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What happens as a consequence of this approach is important. In some cases it turns an
autonomous agent who sought assistance in dying into a victim, and a compassionate person
who provided the assistance into a criminal. The jury is given what for many is a Morton's
fork — either acquit even though guilt has been proven (and suffer the distress of
disrespecting the law), or convict (and suffer the distress of knowing that a person who is no
threat to anyone and who acted out of compassion in the face of intractable suffering will be
sent to jail for a minimum of 25 years). What does not happen via such an approach is also
important. There is no scope for a conversation about society's role in the decision to seek
assistance with dying. For example, "[t]here are at least 70% of Canadians who do not have
access to palliative care. And even when there is access, it is not equitable."13 Access to
home care support services in the face of disease and disability is also intolerably low and
inequitably distributed.14 There is also no scope to consider the impact on various groups
within society, society as a whole, or on the multitude of relationships implicated in the
decision to provide euthanasia or assisted suicide (for example, between patients and health
care providers, patients and families, and groups with differing opinions on the acceptability
of euthanasia and assisted suicide). While these facts could be critically relevant to why
someone requested or provided euthanasia, and how euthanasia and assisted suicide should
be treated by the law, they are considered irrelevant to the assessment of guilt.
A number of other consequences flow, not from actual criminal proceedings as discussed
above, but rather from the risk of criminal charges and imprisonment following the provision
of assistance in even the most compelling cases of euthanasia or assisted suicide15 (that is,
from the Hobson's choice of (1) euthanasia or assisted suicide with the potential for dire
penal consequences, or (2) no assistance in dying):
•

Some individuals are made to endure avoidable suffering. Since death by painless
lethal injection or consumption of a lethal overdose of medication is not available
without dire legal consequences, some die in more rather than less painful ways and
some endure longer rather than shorter periods of pain and other forms of suffering.

•

Individual autonomy is violated as some are forced to continue living even when
their lives are no longer worth living to them, and they are forced to die in ways not
of their choosing.

•

Equality is denied as those individuals who are physically capable of ending their
own lives are free to do so, but those who have a disability that makes them
physically incapable of ending their own lives without assistance are not.

The Honourable Sharon Carstairs, Raising the Bar: A Roadmap for the Future of Palliative Care in
Canada (Canada: The Senate of Canada, 2010) at 3, online: Senator Sharon Carstairs <http://sen.parl.
gc.ca/scarstairs/PalliativeCare/Raising%20the%20Bar%20June%202010%20(2).pdf>.
A useful review of the state of home care in Canada is found in Canadian Healthcare Association, Home
Care in Canada: From the Margins to the Mainstream (Ottawa: Canadian Healthcare Association,
2009), online: Canadian Healthcare Association <http://www.cha.ca/documents/Home_Care_in_
Canada_From_the_Margins_to_the_Mainstream_web.pdf>.
For example, a case involving an individual suffering from paralysis (including loss of the capacity to
breathe) caused by amyotrophic lateral sclerosis or an individual suffering from intractable pain resulting
from terminal bone cancer.
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Some individuals may die earlier than they would if assisted suicide and euthanasia
were not subject to such dire legal consequences — they may choose to commit
suicide when they are still physically capable of doing so to avoid being unable to
commit suicide if the suffering becomes unbearable at a point when they are no
longer physically capable of committing suicide.
The prohibition, coupled with the dire consequences of violating the prohibition,
denies comfort that individuals may feel in knowing that euthanasia or assisted
suicide would be available to them should their suffering become unbearable. As
is clear from the data coming from Oregon (where assisted suicide is now legal),
a significant number of people go so far as to seek the prescription that they can use
for suicide, but never actually commit suicide.16 Considerable psychological
comfort can come from knowing that autonomy will not be lost and an end to
suffering will remain within one's grasp.
Some individuals choose assisted suicide and die alone rather than with family or
friends there to comfort them. They do this to reduce the potential of their loved
ones being sent to jail.
Some family members or friends of those who die as a result of assisted suicide or
euthanasia suffer an extraordinarily high level of stress and distress as they help a
loved one to die; they may suffer stress from the threat of criminal charges and
consequential punishment and/or the distress of participating in an assisted death
that is not peaceful or painless (for example, suffocating a loved one with a pillow)
as more peaceful and painless methods are not available to them without increasing
the risk of dire penal consequences.
The perceived legitimacy of law is diminished as a criminal prohibition of
euthanasia and assisted suicide with dire penal consequences is contrary to public
opinion.17 No strong evidence-based or constitutional values-based arguments can
be made by politicians to explain their ongoing refusal to engage in a serious
attempt to find alternatives to life sentences for euthanasia and lesser jail terms for
assisted suicide in Canada.18 Thus, the spectre of public policy decision-making
based on the fear of single issue right-to-life activists threatens the public's
perception of the legitimacy of law.
It is possible that (assuming they know about the mandatory minimum sentence for
murder19) juries will refuse to convict in cases of euthanasia even if they believe
that it should be illegal, as they may feel that a life sentence in jail is an

In 2009, 95 prescriptions were written under the Oregon statute, 53 individuals committed suicide by
using the prescription, 30 died of their underlying disease, and 12 remained alive, online: Oregon.gov
<http://www.oregon.gov/DHS/ph/pas/docs/yearl2.pdf>.
See generally supra note 5.
For a review of the arguments, see Jocelyn Downie, Dying Justice: A Case for Decriminalizing
Euthanasia & Assisted Suicide in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004) c. 10-11.
See e.g. the description of the jury's reaction in Latimer when they found out about the mandatory
minimum life sentence in Barney Sneiderman, "The betrayal of the Latimer jury: Supreme Court must
restore public faith in a profound civic duty" The Ottawa Citizen (16 January 2001) A15.
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inappropriate response to a case of euthanasia. It is also possible that prosecutors
will decide not to charge individuals with murder in cases of euthanasia or assisted
suicide as they fear jury nullification.20 Thus, as a result, convictions will match
neither the incidence of euthanasia and assisted suicide nor the apparently
prohibitive regime envisioned by the Criminal Code. Some would argue that this
is a problem per se, and others would argue that this is a problem because it will
further diminish the perceived legitimacy of the law.
Thus, it can be seen that there are numerous problems with the current criminal justice
approach taken to euthanasia and assisted suicide. In contrast to this approach, many have
argued for the decriminalization of euthanasia and assisted suicide21 and been met by the
intractable rancorous debate described above. However, there is an alternative approach that
keeps euthanasia and assisted suicide in the Criminal Code but, we would argue, avoids
many of the problems associated with the current approach as outlined above. There is an
approach that we think holds significant promise for ensuring a better response to cases of
euthanasia and assisted suicide and the difficult and important societal issues they raise. The
alternative approach we explore and advocate in this article is that of restorative justice.
Restorative justice has garnered a significant amount of attention in the last two decades,
both nationally and internationally. In large measure, it has developed as an alternative to
traditional criminal justice processes.22 As a result, restorative justice is often identified with
its associated alternative practices/processes, for example, victim-offender mediation or
reconciliation programs, conferencing, and sentencing circles. Restorative justice, so
understood, represents a different way of doing the work of justice, but it has not received
adequate attention for its broader implication, that is, for the different idea of justice it
represents.
We see the potential of restorative justice for responding to cases of euthanasia and
assisted suicide not only (or even primarily) as an alternative process, but also for the
different conception of justice that underlies or supports such practices. We understand
restorative justice and its potential as a theory of justice able to reveal what justice requires
in response to euthanasia and assisted suicide both in substance and process.

See e.g. the factors provided by the prosecutor in the case of Dr. Alberto de la Rocha as outlined in
Downie, supra note 18 at 40. One factor was "the fact that, if it went to trial, we would see ' 12 common
folk from Timmins kind of chart the course for euthanasia at this point in time.'"
Ibid.
Restorative approaches, however, are being employed far beyond the criminal justice realm. In the
justice realm, restorative justice is being applied in civil suits, child protection, family law, and
international human rights law. Restorative approaches are also being employed beyond the justice
context in schools, workplaces, and neighbourhood disputes. Our conception of restorative justice,
rooted in relational theory, makes it clear why it is not limited to the criminal justice context and indeed
reveals the broader implications and applications of a restorative approach for social, political, and legal
processes and institutions.
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III. WHAT KIND OF JUSTICE is RESTORATIVE JUSTICE?
Restorative justice is a relational theory of justice.23 This means that it starts from an
understanding of people and the world where relationship — connection rather than
separation or independence — is foundational. Restorative justice proceeds from the
assumption that we are relational beings; we are unavoidably connected with one another in
various complex and multi-layered ways. It is not a predilection for relationships that drives
restorative justice — not a conviction that relationship is a good or a goal in and of itself.
Relationships can certainly be positive or negative. Rather, a relational orientation reveals
that, for good or bad, they are. There is not then a choice to be made between relationship
and no relationship. We are, on a relational theory, inextricably and by our nature, in basic
and more robust ways, in relation with one another.
Relational theory pays serious attention to relationships and how they are structured, the
effects they have on those involved, and what is needed from our relationships with one
another to assure our well-being and flourishing. The work of justice understood relationally
includes the identification of where harmful relationships exist or where harm has been
caused to relationships. It seeks just relationships — what Jennifer Llewellyn has elsewhere
referred to as "equality of relationship."24 The goal is not to mirror certain archetypes of
personal relationship. Justice here is concerned with the character of relationships that is
fundamental in order forthose in the relationships to thrive. Relationships with this character
are those marked by equal respect, concern, and dignity. This is a measure of justice
understood in a restorative way. A task of justice in each case is then to ascertain what is
required by the context and circumstances of the parties affected by a situation to build
restored relationships — relationships of equal respect, concern, and dignity.25
Restorative justice as a relational theory of justice rejects an individualistic approach to
justice. Instead, it is grounded in a conception of human beings as relational. Such a
conception does not focus on the collective over or against the individual. Rather, it posits
a responsive relationship between the two. Individuals, on a relational conception, are formed
and act in and through relationships with others. In the process, individuals shape and
influence those very relationships. Restorative justice is not communitarian justice insofar
as communitarian justice entails a deterministic role for community in relation to the
individual. Restorative justice is concerned with individuals as they live in and through
relationship. Individuals, on this view, still possess agency and thereby responsibility and
accountability for their choices and actions. However, restorative justice does require
attention to the fact that such choices are not made alone and have implications for and affect
others.

This conception of restorative justice has been developed and advanced in Llewellyn's previous work:
see e.g. Jennifer J. Llewellyn & Robert Howse, Restorative Justice: A Conceptual Framework (Law
Commission of Canada, 1998); Jennifer Llewellyn, "Justice for South Africa: Restorative Justice and
the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission" in Christine M. Koggel, ed., Moral Issues in
Global Perspective (Peterborough: Broadview Press, 1999) 96. For a more general consideration of
relational theory, see Jocelyn Downie & Jennifer J. Llewellyn, eds., Being Relational: Reflections on
Relational Theory & Health Law and Policy (Vancouver: UBC Press) [forthcoming in 2011]. Within
that volume, see especially Jennifer J. Llewellyn, "Restorative Justice: Thinking Relationally About
Justice" [Llewellyn, "Thinking Relationally About Justice"].
Llewellyn, "Thinking Relationally About Justice," ibid.
Llewellyn & Howse, supra note 23 at 15.
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Restorative justice is thus a different approach in both substance and form from the
traditional approach through which society has, to date, dealt with the issues of euthanasia
and assisted suicide. It is because of these differences that we think restorative justice stands
to make a world of difference in how we understand and deal with cases of euthanasia and
assisted suicide. In the remainder of the paper we sketch what difference we think restorative
justice could make, consider how such an approach might be implemented, and reflect upon
some of the challenges that might arise when trying to implement such an approach.

IV. THE DIFFERENCE THAT
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE MIGHT MAKE
A.

A BROADER UNDERSTANDING OF HARM

The current approach differs from a restorative justice approach in terms of how it
identifies a wrong. The current criminal justice approach equates wrong (which warrants a
justice response) with lawbreaking, and will see wrong in all cases of euthanasia and assisted
suicide simply because there has been a breach of the law. Restorative justice, on the other
hand, determines wrong on the basis of resulting and related harm. It is thereby capable of
seeing that a wanted death may not have been harmful, and therefore would not constitute
a wrong despite the fact that a law has been broken.26
The notion of harm is also different between the two approaches. Harm is understood
relationally in restorative justice. Harm to individuals is important, but it cannot be fully
appreciated without a sense of the harms that may result or be related in terms of an
individual's relationships with others — the "offender," other "victims," their families,
support communities, and broader society. By virtue of our relationality, harm to individuals
affects those connected to them and the nature of their connection to others. Taking this
broader view of harm and the extent to which it does not only reside in individuals means
that you can more easily recognize harms to relationships (at micro and macro levels) absent
direct harms to individuals. In the context of euthanasia and assisted suicide this creates
space to consider the potential justice issues that may arise without having to get at them by
establishing an individual victim or offender. There are cases where it might seem
inappropriate to describe someone receiving what they want (an end to unrelievable suffering
through a peaceful death at the time of their choosing) as a "victim" or a compassionate
family member or doctor as an "offender." We might nevertheless have concerns about the
systemic or specific sets of circumstances that surrounded or prompted the choice to seek
euthanasia and assisted suicide (for example, poorpain management, lack of family supports,
and inadequate psychological support). Similarly we might remain concerned about the
potential for broader societal harm, for instance, the erosion of respect for life or the implicit
devaluing of certain members of society. Restorative justice allows for the recognition of,
and response to, these potential harms.

This leaves open the possibility that harm may flow from a breach of the law; as such, the harm would
not be caused by the act of assisted suicide or euthanasia, but rather by the general breach of norms set
by society that we rely on for order and security. Addressing that sort of harm might require quite a
different response, and restorative justice opens up space to be clear about the nature of the harm and
then to think about the appropriate response.

RESTORATIVE JUSTICE, EUTHANASIA, AND ASSISTED SUICIDE
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ENHANCED ACCOUNTABILITY AND RESPONSIBILITY

Restorative justice's relational approach to harm reveals a much broader set of potential
"parties" (as those that are affected by or have a stake in the situation) who should be
involved or engaged in the justice response to euthanasia or assisted suicide. Because of the
focus on harm to relationships we can see how and why a broader set of individuals and
groups might be affected. We can conceive of parties in meaningful ways that the traditional
approach, with its adversarial logic, struggles to find. For example, the traditional approach
easily accommodates offender and state. The recognition of the victim is more constrained
and limited.27 By contrast, a restorative approach reveals the webs of relationship involved
or affected by an incident and the fact that the harms extend beyond the deceased or the state
to the families and support communities of both the deceased and the offender, other interest
groups (for example, doctors, advocates for persons with disabilities, the end of life care
community), and the broader public. The complexity of their connections and the effects
upon them are not lost on restorative justice. Restorative justice not only broadens the view
and categories of those involved, but also treats them as fluid and complicated. This might
mean that the doctor who assisted with euthanasia or suicide is neither villain nor hero nor
martyr, and a family who assisted may need compassion rather than condemnation. Since a
restorative approach is not focused on ascribing blame (in justification of punishment meted
out) it can seek accountability and responsibility in more nuanced, concrete, and specific
ways. The complex picture of what happened and who was involved and affected in a given
situation is what is required for a complete picture of responsibility, and thus for meaningful
accountability.
One of the enduring critiques of restorative justice is that it is too "soft" of a response to
crime. This critique grounds two concerns commonly expressed about a restorative approach.
The first concern is that because restorative responses are not punitive they do not provide
adequate consequences, and thus cannot convey moral censure of such acts and thereby
discourage similar acts in future. The second concern is that the broader view of the context
and causes of an incident serves to reduce individual offenders' responsibility — that it
blames circumstances or society, and thus does not hold offenders accountable. On both
counts the basis for the concern about restorative justice as being "soft" or inadequate justice
is misplaced. It is true that a restorative approach is not punitive. Justice on a restorative
account is not sought through laying blame and responding with what punishment is deemed
deserved by virtue of the crime. But restorative justice is still concerned with responsibility
and accountability.

For an account of the rise of the role of the state and corresponding exclusion of victims in the
development of the Western legal system, see Harold J. Herman, Law and Revolution: The Formation
of the Western Legal Tradition (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983). Recent reforms to the
criminal justice process have sought to accommodate some role for victims within the process. For a
discussion of these inclusionary reforms, see Bruce P. Archibald, "Coordinating Canada's Restorative
and Inclusionary Models of Criminal Justice: The Legal Profession and the Exercise of Discretion under
a Reflexive Rule of Law" (2005) 9 Can. Crim. L. Rev. 215 at 228. However, the spaces created within
the criminal justice approach are still marginal. For the most part their involvement is still structured to
support the state through testimony at the trial stage, or at the sentencing phase through victim impact
statements. While modern reforms have become more inclusive of victims they have not brought the
victim into the process in the central or significant way that is offered by restorative justice processes.
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Restorative responses are centrally concerned with understanding and addressing the harm
resulting from a wrong. Those who have caused or contributed to the harm have an
obligation within a restorative justice approach to understand the effects of their actions so
that they can play an active role in figuring out how to address the harms. Requiring an active
role of those who have caused harm contributes to a stronger notion of responsibility and
accountability within restorative justice. Responsibility is not simply assigned or ascribed
in restorative justice processes, but must be understood and accepted by those involved.
Individuals are not simply held accountable by the traditional approach of externally imposed
conviction and punishment. Rather, a restorative justice approach achieves more significant
accountability because individuals accept responsibility and then participate actively in
addressing the harm they have caused. This accountability is often made even more
meaningful because it happens in the context of processes that involve those that these
individuals care about and respect. It is not a system holding offenders to account through
formal and one-size-fits-all mechanisms. Restorative justice approaches require that those
who cause harm be accountable through participation and action. The requirement to address
the harm resulting from one's action means that while restorative justice does not respond
to those who have caused harm with punishment, it does entail consequences for those who
cause harm. Such consequences are not imposed on them by others, but rather are agreed to
by the individual who caused the harm. The consequences are not for the purpose of causing
an equal measure of harm, but rather come about because of the obligations to address the
harm generated by the harmful act.
The concern that restorative approaches are too soft also stems from the fact that, through
their relational approach, restorative justice processes may not ascribe responsibility
exclusively to the individual wrongdoer. Restorative justice processes attend to the contexts,
causes, and circumstances of the act that might reveal a more complex story about
responsibility for the harms. This broader picture may mean that responsibility for what
occurred is shared. The worry is that this might let the individuals who are largely
responsible off lightly, or perhaps even free. Even if they are still seen as partly responsible,
critics might argue, the ability to shine the light of responsibility elsewhere will reduce
accountability for those individuals most responsible. With an approach like the traditional
one, where calculating the quantum of blame is essential for legitimizing and meting out
punishment, this concern about a more nuanced and complex picture of responsibility might
be serious. But a restorative justice approach is not focused on laying the ground for
punishment. It is concerned with ensuring responsibility and accountability so that the harms
resulting from the wrongful act can be appreciated and addressed in order that restored
relationships can be built. This goal requires a more complex picture of responsibility, not
in order to let any party off easier, but so that those who bear some responsibility for the
situation can play a part in addressing it and building a better situation for the future. If there
are other relevant causes and circumstances beyond the control of an individual wrongdoer
(for example, inadequate health care services), it would be unjust and ineffective to lay the
burden of redress upon the individual alone. Recognizing shared responsibility ensures that
the actual responsibility of the individual and all others involved is accurately reflected in
the response. This may mean in turn that the individual charged with an offence accepts
accountability and the resulting consequences. Insofar as these other factors, contexts, and
circumstances are deemed irrelevant by the individualistic focus of the traditional approach,

RESTORATIVE JUSTICE, EUTHANASIA, AND ASSISTED SUICIDE

975

the risk is that, in taking that approach, law's legitimacy is reduced and the law's response
will not restore relationships.
The other way in which the traditional approach seeks to assure accountability is through
the moral censure that comes through punishment. As the above discussion reveals,
restorative justice does not forgo accountability or consequences for one's actions. The
argument for the importance of punishment for the sake of moral education sometimes rests
on the assumption that a choice is required between punishment and no response. But
restorative justice does not make such a choice. It does forgo punishment, but it ensures
meaningful response to harm in the form of active participation in reparation of harm. In this
way, restorative justice challenges the identification of punishment with accountability. A
similar challenge is made to the claim that punishment is required to communicate the moral
message that certain acts are unacceptable. Not only are restorative processes capable of
conveying this moral message (by virtue of ensuring a response to a wrong that requires the
active participation of those responsible) but, by their nature, restorative processes might be
better at the task of moral communication and education. Quite simply, relying on
punishment to convey moral messages can be an ineffective form of communication.
Restorative processes actually create processes in which actual (rather than symbolic and
virtual) communication between and among the parties (the victim, offender, their support
communities, interest communities, and the broader society) is possible, and indeed probable.
Moral messages can be conveyed, heard, and actually reflected upon within a process that
does not rely on punishment as a surrogate. Further, the fact that restorative processes
involve more than just the individual wrongdoer means that these messages can be
communicated to a wider audience, thereby affirming societal values.28
In the context of euthanasia and assisted suicide this is particularly important given that
one of the serious concerns about the apparent failure to prosecute cases to the fullest extent
of the law29 is an erosion of the sanctity and respect for human life and, in more specific
circumstances, concern that certain members of society (the elderly or persons with
disabilities) might be devalued. This same concern motivates some to argue that punishment
of euthanasia and assisted suicide is essential. Punishment sends a message about the
seriousness and importance of respect for, and protection of, human life. By punishing these
acts, the state declares them to be of public concern and a matter of public order and safety.
Punishment is also seen as a means of ensuring accountability since it brings the resources
of the state to bear in the bid to hold offenders accountable. However, in the case of
euthanasia and assisted suicide, such an approach has arguably had the opposite effect than
intended. Criminalization (particularly where it is accompanied by mandatory minimum
sentences) is a very blunt instrument. It requires stark choices — prosecute or not, find guilty
or not, stigmatize or not. In the face of what are often morally complex cases where
criminalization cannot accommodate more nuanced responses, police, prosecutors, judges
(and sometimes juries) are left in very difficult positions. This difficulty is perhaps most
acute for prosecutors, as they are charged with exercising their discretion to pursue a case
in the public interest or not. It is not always clear-cut that prosecuting euthanasia and assisted

28
w

A fuller discussion of the role and relationship between punishment and restorative justice can be found
in Jennifer J. Llewellyn, Punishment & Restorative Justice (LL.M. Thesis, Harvard University, 2001).
See Jocelyn Downie & Simone Bern, "Rodriguez Redux" (2008) 16 Health L.J. 27 at 30-31; Downie,
supra note 18 at 35-36, 43.
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suicide cases under the current regime will serve the public interest, particularly where the
evidence makes prosecution difficult or where the culpability of the individual accused is
neither clear nor theirs alone. Yet with the decision not to prosecute, an opportunity to
consider the broader context and circumstances of the case and its implications for law,
policy, and public values is lost.
Of course a restorative justice process does not always avoid prosecution and punishment.
Restorative processes can be used as an alternative to criminal charges, thus avoiding
criminalization of the specific acts. Typically this would mean that no criminal record would
be generated as a result of a restorative process. This would be the case where restorative
processes are undertaken pre-charge (typically referral by the police) or pre-trial (referral by
the prosecution). But restorative processes can also be employed at later stages in the
traditional process (for example, referrals by judges at the sentencing stage or by corrections
officials as part of a rehabilitation or re-entry plan). Since restorative justice represents a
different way of thinking about justice and its demands, it is a better fit earlier in the
traditional process as, essentially, a diversion. As a case proceeds through the traditional
process, the focus on harm caused is obscured and the more nuanced and meaningful
processes of responsibility and accountability are lost. The later restorative justice enters the
process, the more work is required to undo the individualistic logic of the traditional
approach. However, while preferable to undertake a restorative approach to justice from the
outset of a case, it is still possible for restorative approaches to be of some benefit later in the
process. A restorative justice approach, for example, might be able to carve some space for
a more nuanced understanding of what happened (beyond the mere actus reus of the offence)
and what remedies might be appropriate.30
There is another way in which the use of restorative justice processes in place of the
traditional approach is helpful — they are more likely to assure a response to cases of
euthanasia and assisted suicide. The blunt instrument of the traditional approach leaves
prosecutors little choice if they feel the public interest is not served by prosecution — either
charge the accused or make no response. However, by avoiding the stigma and rigidity of the
traditional approach, a restorative justice approach is more likely to lead to a response to
cases of euthanasia and assisted suicide.
C.

A PROACTIVE AND PREVENTATIVE Focus

As mentioned in the discussion above, the focus of a restorative justice approach stands
in contrast to the traditional approach. The traditional approach is primarily backward
focused. It is concerned with ensuring that offenders pay for their past deeds. It is focused
on balancing the scales through the meting out of punishment that "fits" the crime. The focus
is on past deeds and what is deserved in response. By contrast, a restorative justice approach
is primarily future focused. This does not mean that, in a restorative process, what happened

One of the serious potential challenges for the use of restorative justice later in the criminal justice
process is the existence of mandatory minima that require not only punishment, but a particular form that
is isolating and generally harmful to the prospect of building respectful relationships marked by dignity
and mutual concern. This is a challenge that exists in the context of euthanasia as it is currently treated
within the Criminal Code. One of the advantages of introducing a restorative justice approach earlier
in the process is that it opens space to consider more appropriate responses/consequences that can better
contribute to restored relationships in the future.
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or what was done in the past is unimportant. What happened or what was done in the past
is central to the process, but for a different reason than within the traditional approach. A
restorative justice approach cares about what happened in the past in order to understand the
implications and effects of the deed (the harms that resulted) and the context, circumstances,
and factors that contributed to the situation. A restorative process would, for example,
absolutely canvass whether the person given assistance to die was competent, made the
request freely, was in pain that could not be relieved, and had been given alternatives. It
would also canvass what services were available, who was involved in the decision-making
process and the euthanasia or assisted suicide, and why. A restorative process seeks this
understanding not for its own sake or in order to ascribe blame and a deserved response but,
rather, in order to craft a different future. The aim of restorative justice is the establishment
of restored relationships for the future, not evening the score for past wrongs. Such
relationships require that past harms and unjust relationships be understood, addressed, and
transformed, and the past is relevant in this way.
One of the advantages of the future focus of restorative justice is that it is consciously
concerned with deterrence and prevention. However, it does not rely on negative incentives
to avoid future behaviour. Rather, it seeks to create the conditions in which future harm is
less likely. The traditional approach pursues deterrence through the use of punishment
despite the continued failure to prove the hypothesis that more and harsher punishments will
deter. Restorative justice processes operate on a different hypothesis (one with more
empirical credibility), that the more one is embedded in a web of relationships of equal
respect, concern, and dignity, the less likely one is to cause harm. In the case of euthanasia
and assisted suicide the immediate concern is less often with specific deterrence (that the
same person will commit the act again, with the possible exception of where a health care
provider is involved), but with general deterrence (the fear that this behaviour will serve as
a bad example for others in society who might be inclined to the same behaviour).
Restorative justice processes are also more likely to serve the interests of general
deterrence than the traditional approach. First, insofar as officials are more likely to proceed
with a case where they can take a restorative approach than when they must take the
traditional approach, the surety of a response is more likely to deter others than is the current
uneven and unpredictable enforcement regime.31 But beyond such practical concerns, by
virtue of their capacity to involve the broader public and to conduct meaningful reflections
on the moral and legal issues involved, and to communicate these to the public, restorative
justice is better able to influence behaviour of others.32 Also, because restorative justice
processes look at all of the relationships implicated in the case, and are therefore able to
consider the range of factors that might have contributed to, motivated, or enabled the
situation, the factors might actually be addressed so as not to contribute to similar choices
or situations in the future. For example, if one of the issues in a particular case was
inadequate support for end of life care or home support for parents of children with profound

See Downie & Bern, supra note 29, for a summary of the cases.
See generally John Braithwaite & Philip Pettit, Not Just Deserts: A Republican Theory of Criminal
Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990); John Braithwaite, Crime, Shame and Reintegration
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice & Responsive
Regulation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); Lawrence W. Sherman & Heather Strang,
Restorative Justice: The Evidence (London: Smith Institute, 2007).
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health issues, a restorative process can deal with these issues as a central concern of what
justice requires and contribute to changing the factors that might lead to similar situations in
the future. Similarly, if a lack of knowledge about appropriate and available treatments or
competency assessments is at issue in a particular case, a restorative process could focus on
improving the education of health care professionals.
Restorative justice responses to specific cases, then, are capable of considering the broader
issues that surround the situation and are relevant to preventing or replicating situations in
the future. The individual backward looking focus of the traditional approach does little or
nothing to address such issues as part of its search for justice. Insofar as they are revealed,
it is usually by chance or outside of the justice process. This is yet another reason to
commend the use of a restorative approach in the context of euthanasia and assisted suicide.
In their reaction to specific circumstances, such processes are able to be proactive and
preventative. Through such processes, the parties can reflect upon relevant law and policy
and consider its role and adequacy. As we discuss in the next section, restorative justice
processes are democratic in character and function. What is significant about such processes
for law and policy relating to euthanasia and assisted suicide is that they can serve as a
democratic feedback loop of sorts about current law and policy. Such processes thus have
the potential to provide democratic input into law and policy-making and reform.

D.

A MORE INCLUSIVE, PARTICIPATORY, AND DEMOCRATIC PROCESS

Throughout the foregoing sections of the article, a picture of restorative justice processes
has emerged. As mentioned earlier, it is important to see the potential of restorative justice
to respond to cases of euthanasia and assisted suicide as flowing from the fact of it being not
only an alternative process, but also an alternative understanding of justice. The substantive
understanding of justice and what it requires has clear implications for justice processes. One
of the implications that is sometimes lost amidst detailed descriptions of restorative justice
encounter processes (victim-offender mediation models as well as the more robust
conferencing or circle processes) is that these moments of structured encounter are not the
totality of a restorative process. Encounter processes are important within restorative justice,
as we will discuss below, because they provide an opportunity for parties to meet and
participate together in a dialogical process to craft an outcome that will address the harm and
work to restore relationships. As important as they are though, encounter processes on their
own cannot achieve restorative justice. The success of such processes relies on a careful and
thorough preparation of the parties (which may include building their capacities to participate
in such a process). Fundamentally, encounter processes lay the foundation for the work of
restoring relationships both by modeling and giving parties an experience of positive
relationship with one another, and also as a means of crafting the outcome agreements to be
carried out by the parties. These agreements often set out the work needed to move towards
restored relationships. What follows such encounters is the "doing of justice."
In some sense our traditional justice vocabulary is inadequate to restorative justice. We
talk of justice being done, but the nature of relationships is that they are never static and rigid
— they are fluid, dynamic, and ever-changing. Thus, on a relational conception of justice,
it is more accurate to describe justice as something we do, and must keep doing, rather than
something done. Certainly a just response can be made to a given case and it can contribute
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to the achievement of just relationships. This nature of restorative justice then will have
implications for its practice. The non-static nature of relational justice requires that as much
attention be paid to preparation and follow-up as to the encounter process itself. It also means
that a restorative justice process should be conceived of as more than a one-off conference
or meeting. It will involve preparation and follow-up work but also, depending on the
situation and the relationships affected, it may involve more than one encounter in a given
process. One might have to bring the same parties back together more than once to arrive at
an acceptable outcome plan or it may be appropriate, in a complex case, to have different
processes to deal with the distinct issues or harms involved.
Three process elements most clearly differentiate restorative justice processes from
processes that flow from the traditional approach. Restorative justice processes are more
inclusive, participatory, and democratic. The inclusivity of restorative justice processes is
demanded by the broader set of parties seen to be affected or interested in the resolution of
a situation. As discussed above, a restorative justice approach reveals that the parties to a
situation cannot be limited to the offender and the state, or even the victim, offender, and the
state. The harms associated with the situation extend beyond these parties, and the contexts,
causes, and circumstances of the situation have broader implications and effects. The goal
of a restorative justice process is to restore the relationships affected and, in order to do so,
such processes must include all those affected and all those required to achieve such a
restoration. In the case of euthanasia and assisted suicide, we could imagine, for example,
that those who should be involved would include the accused, their supporters (including
family, friends, and/or colleagues), the person who died (often referred to as "the victim,"
but we reject this label as it belies the fact that in many cases the death was desired), that
person's family, friends, and/or supporters, and others who are affected or harmed.
Restorative justice can comprehend different parties and the different ways in which parties
might be harmed. For example, those harmed might include the family or friends of the
person who died or representatives of those similarly situated (for example, if the person had
a disability), other interest communities directly concerned or involved, and the general
public or state. One of the advantages of a restorative approach is that it might also provide
more nuance and guidance as to which state actor(s) should be involved. For example, it
might not be a prosecutor. Given the situation, it might be more appropriate for a
representative from the Departments of Health and/or Justice to participate. A health official
might be far better placed to contribute to an understanding of what happened and why, and
the process of designing a fitting response to the situation (including, perhaps, actions to be
taken by the Department of Health).
Yet mere inclusiveness does not make a process restorative; those included must also
participate in the process. Restorative processes do not simply seek input from different
parties in order to determine or adjudge an outcome. Rather, the process is a collective one.
With the assistance of a facilitator, the group must work to come to an agreement about how
to respond to the situation. There are, of course, some limits on the allowable outcomes —
they must be consistent with the substantive goal of restorative justice in establishing
relationships of equal respect, concern, and dignity.
The commitment to participation, then, might best be described as "democratic." By
"democratic" we obviously do not mean that parties vote within the process. Rather, we
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invoke the concept in its more robust sense of participation in decision-making.33 Restorative
justice processes are not only democratic in terms of their nature, but they can also serve a
democratic function. As a result of their inclusive and participatory nature (which considers
the harm, its context, and its causes), and their future orientation, restorative processes
provide a venue in which to reflect upon the law and its application and implications. These
reflections can then be fed back into law-making and reform processes, thus serving as part
of a democratic feedback loop. The traditional approach to prosecuting cases of euthanasia
and assisted suicide, by contrast, lacks these inclusive, participatory, and democratic features.
V. BUILDING A RESTORATIVE RESPONSE TO
EUTHANASIA AND ASSISTED SUICIDE
The preceding consideration of restorative justice and what it might bring as a new
approach to euthanasia and assisted suicide provides a basis from which to consider what a
process or program to deal with these cases might look like in practice. Restorative
approaches, as they seek to restore the relationships at stake in a given situation or with
respect to a particular issue, must be grounded in and attentive to the particular contexts and
circumstances to which they are being applied. Furthermore, restorative principles must
guide the development of specific restorative processes or programs.34 For these processes
to be appropriate and successful, it is important that there is input from the parties most
concerned at the design phase as well as within a process to address a particular case.
Designing a program to deal with euthanasia and assisted suicide should therefore involve
participation by those with a general or particular interest in the issue. For example,
physicians, nurses, and other health care professionals, as well as organizations representing
individuals with particular diseases or conditions and individuals with particular views on
the moral issues implicated in euthanasia and assisted suicide. Their participation in the
design of such processes will ensure that the resulting processes are able to effectively deal
with the issues for all affected. It will, for example, bring expertise to bear about issues of
timing, location, potential power imbalances, or capacity issues that would need to be
addressed and a sense of the scope of the process including which parties, expert supports,
and other resources might be needed and available for the process. Involving the stakeholders
in a meaningful way in planning such a process or program is also more likely to assure
willing participation in future processes and their legitimacy. If parties have input into the
design of a process, they are more likely to identify it as fair and be willing to respect its
results.35

Jiirgen Habermas' work on discourse and democracy might provide some important insights here. See
generally Jiirgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and
Democracy, trans, by William Rehg (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996); Jiirgen Habermas, The Theory of
Communicative Action: Reason and the Rationalization of Society, vol. 1, trans, by Thomas McCarthy
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1984); Jiirgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action: Lifeworldand
System: A Critique ofFunctionalist Reason, vol. 2, trans, by Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press,
1987). An example of this idea of democracy was articulated by the Supreme Court of Canada in
Reference Re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217.
Llewellyn & Howse, supra note 23 at 42. See also Jennifer J. Llewellyn, "Restorative Justice in
Transitions and Beyond: The Justice Potential of Truth-Telling Mechanisms for Post-Peace Accord
Societies" in Tristan Anne Borer, ed., Telling The Truths: Truth Telling and Peace Building in PostConflict Societies (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006) 83.
Significant attention has been paid to this idea since John Thibaut and Laurens Walker's early work on
procedural justice, ProceduralJustice: A Psychological Analysis (Hillsdale, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum
Associates, 1975). Since that time, the proposition has been tested and affirmed: see e.g. W. Chan Kim
& Renee Mauborgne, "Fair Process: Managing in the Knowledge Economy" (1997) 75:4 Harvard
Business Review 65.
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One of the other potential benefits of bringing together interested parties for a discussion
related to the design of a restorative program is that it provides an opportunity for those with
very different perspectives on the issues to be clear about what the real concerns are that
should be taken up in a restorative process.36 This sort of open communication is less likely
to occur in the current context, where the definition of what justice entails is structured by
the traditional approach to prosecuting criminal offences.
The operative definition of justice in the current system often shapes our desired outcome
and position. Here the case of Robert Latimer is instructive.37 Many advocates for persons
with disabilities were actively involved in discussions of this case through the media. Their
concern was the potential erosion of respect for the lives of those living with profound
disabilities and the precedent that Latimer might set for other families. But instead of being
able to address that issue directly and consider an outcome for that case which would address
that concern directly, the only measure of justice available through the traditional approach
was Latimer's sentence and time served as recognition of the seriousness with which the state
took the concern. Unfortunately, in the end, Latimer's imprisonment did little or nothing to
improve the lives of those like his daughter Tracy, or families in similar situations. It also did
very little to change the culture or societal views of disability in ways that advocates sought.
Rather than being able to take a position in favour of an outcome that would address the
harms at the heart of their concern, advocates spent most of their energies and political
capital seeking the justice that was on offer — a prison sentence for Latimer.
In light of our commitment to restorative principles in the design as well as conduct of
restorative processes, it is not possible to offer a ready-made model for dealing with
euthanasia and assisted suicide. Such processes/programs may well differ from one
context/jurisdiction to another and still be entirely restorative so long as they reflect the
substance and process principles of restorative justice. But this does not mean that there is
no guidance we can offer to suggest a program for initial consideration and identify issues
that would warrant careful attention in the design of such a program. Indeed, there are
models of restorative justice programs that would provide a sound and informative basis from
which to develop a restorative response to euthanasia and assisted suicide cases. In the
Canadian context, perhaps most helpful in this regard is the Nova Scotia Restorative Justice
Program (NSRJP).38 Piloted in 1999, the NSRJP was in full operation throughout the
province by 2001. In its first two phases, the NSRJP was intended to apply to youths ranging
from 12-17 in age (under the jurisdiction of the Youth Criminal Justice Act39). Having had
success with young people, the NSRJP is about to enter its third phase — pilot use with

Broadening the scope of what is at stake in such cases also creates opportunities for alliances and allies
on issues related to the protection and respect for life and the supports needed to assure it.
See Downie, supra note 18 at 40-41, for a description of the case and citations to the multiple decisions
emanating from various court levels.
For more detailed information about the NSRJP, see Bruce Archibald & Jennifer Llewellyn, "The
Challenges of Institutionalizing Comprehensive Restorative Justice: Theory and Practice in Nova
Scotia" (2006) 29 Dalhousie L.J. 297. There are other instructive and helpful models. For example, in
the Canadian context insights might be drawn from the Collaborative Justice Program in Ottawa. This
program was co-located with the Provincial Court in Ottawa and took referrals from the Court related
to serious adult offences. For information about the program, see online: Collaborative Justice Program
<http://www.collaborativejustice.ca/>.
S.C. 2002, c. 1.
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adults. This recent development would also open up space to consider its use with respect
to euthanasia and assisted suicide.
The Nova Scotia model is a helpful one for consideration in this context for a number of
reasons. First, it has entry points at each stage of the traditional criminal justice process:
charge, prosecution, sentencing, and corrections. Thus, each of the system actors (police,
prosecutors, judges, and corrections officials) can make a referral to the NSRJP. This model
would work well for euthanasia and assisted suicide as it would allow referral of cases at
various stages to respond to different sorts of concerns. It would also allow for euthanasia
and assisted suicide cases to be treated in a traditional fashion in circumstances that would
not be amenable to a restorative justice approach — for example, where the person accused
as the provider or assistant disputes the allegation and wishes to prove the alleged facts at
trial, or where the individual is not ready or able to participate in a restorative process.
Generally, the inappropriateness of a restorative process in a particular case will be fairly
easy to ascertain because the individual will simply refuse to take part, an assessment reveals
that the individual is not psychologically ready or able to participate, or there is an
assessment of threat or danger if the person is not subject to incarceration. But, given what
we know about euthanasia and assisted suicide cases,40 such situations are likely to be rare.
For the majority of those involved in these cases there will be no such barrier to participation.
However, it is important to highlight that restorative processes are voluntary processes.
Because they rely upon the active participation of the parties, and ultimately their willingness
to work towards addressing the harm caused and restoring relationships, it is not possible to
force this or require it. While it is possible to punish an unwilling subject, the work of
restoring relationships cannot be forced.
Another instructive feature of the NSRJP is the roles and relationships of government and
community actors within the NSRJP. Because restorative justice programs should be
embedded in the contexts they seek to respond to, it would be very difficult to operate a
restorative justice program wholly within a government system that was not grounded in
community. Such a state-owned model would also pose problems for its top-down character.
A relational approach cannot be forced or handed down but, rather, to have legitimacy and
access to the information it needs to be responsive to the relationships affected, it needs to
be rooted in community. However, the reverse proposition — that of restorative justice
wholly owned by the community with no state involvement— is not ideal either. Quite apart
from the precarious position this might cause in terms of resource stability, the lack of state
involvement would be a potential problem for other reasons. Without state involvement,
programs may not be accessible or equitable in their treatment of all. The state (at least in
Canada) has an important role to play with respect to rights protection. Ideally, the quality
of programs would be assured for all those who access them, even in different communities.
The state thus has a role to assist in the establishment and enforcement of standards for a
program. It is therefore useful to consider a model such as that used in Nova Scotia because
the state and communities are partners in the NSRJP. The state sets out, facilitates, and
oversees the program, but the program is animated, developed, and implemented in the

See descriptions of cases in the Right to Die Society Researchers' Buffet on Assisted Suicide in Canada
and Compassionate Homicide in Canada, online: Right to Die Society of Canada <http://www.
righttodie.ca/>, and in the case-specific references provided therein.
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various communities throughout the province by community-based agencies. The fully
regional model may not be best for a program dealing with euthanasia and assisted suicide
(for reasons such as the likely low case volume), but the important point is that some
community insights and participation in the program are key to its acceptance and success.
The challenges and weaknesses of the NSRJP are also instructive. One of the significant
drawbacks of the NSRJP is the streaming of referrals based on the level or type of offence.
The NSRJP determines the point in the traditional process at which an individual can access
the program by virtue of the type of offence committed (or charged). The system thus
attempts to ensure that the more serious offences are referred later in the criminal justice
process, with the result that some types of offences cannot be referred until after a conviction
has been entered. The problem with this system is not that there might be some cases that are
not amenable to restorative justice early on and that need to progress through the traditional
process further before being referred. The problem is with the use of the level or type of
offence as a basis to make this determination. A restorative justice approach draws one's
attention to the seriousness of the harm caused and the willingness and capacity of the parties
involved to address the harm with a view to restoring relationships. The level or type of
offence does not always accurately reflect its seriousness in terms of harms caused.
Nor does it accurately predict the appropriateness of a case for a restorative justice
approach. Streaming cases in this way gives "low end" cases greater access to restorative
process (they can be referred at earlier stages and fully diverted from the traditional process).
Not only is this manner of streaming cases a poor reflection of the seriousness of a case in
terms of harm or its amenability to restorative justice, it also might lead to the impression that
restorative justice is only appropriate in cases of low harm and should be avoided where
there is more serious harm — for example, cases involving interpersonal violence. However,
recent evidence suggests that, contrary to common assumptions, restorative approaches work
particularly well in the cases we tend to consider to be more serious.41 This issue of the
design of restorative programs is particularly important with respect to euthanasia and
assisted suicide. Given the level or type of offence that they represent, they would be
assumed under a streamed system to be serious and thus appropriate for referral only at the
later stages of the traditional criminal justice process. This pre-empts one of the central issues
of importance in such cases: the assessment of the level and nature of the harm involved.
Some cases of euthanasia and assisted suicide will not involve a high level of actual harm
to the parties involved, although they may warrant attention for the potential harm of failing
to fully understand the situation and address any issue that might have influenced the
decisions in ways that are of concern. These cases should not be streamed as amenable for
a restorative process only once dealt with through the traditional process. Indeed, given the
interpersonal relationships often involved in these cases and the grief that is often involved
in the loss of a loved one, it may cause harm where there is little reason to delay instigation
of a restorative process. Even where there is harm (where, for example, there may have been
disagreement within a family or between a physician and family), it is the sort of
interpersonal harm that restorative processes deal with particularly well.

Sherman & Strang, supra note 32 at 21.
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Designing a restorative justice response for euthanasia and assisted suicide will require
careful attention to several other issues that bear some comment here. First, it will be
important to develop a strategy or approach for who (in general) should be included as
parties within the process. Of course, the participants will and should differ depending upon
the case. It is, however, important to consider who the parties will be in a general way for
two reasons. First, it frames where to look to invite parties to participate. It is very easy in
a new approach to fall back on the assumptions of a more familiar approach, in this case the
current criminal justice system's sense of who has a stake in the matter. These assumptions
would lead one to focus primarily on the traditional categories of offender, victim, and state.
But as is evident from the above discussion of restorative justice, it requires a much broader
conceptions of parties. Second, it is important to consider who might be parties in order to
think through some of the complexities and process challenges that might develop in cases
where there are a large number of parties wanting to participate. This might be a particular
concern where the broader societal issues seem to loom larger than those harms related to the
incident itself. In such cases, consideration should be given to how to address both concerns
without undue burden (which might be harmful) to the direct parties.
Another, but perhaps related, issue that should be considered is that of confidentiality.
This issue sometimes arises as a result of the relationships between restorative processes and
traditional criminal justice processes. If restorative justice processes are conducted as
referrals from the traditional processes, the case can be returned to the traditional process
either at the request of the accused or if a satisfactory result cannot be found through the
restorative process. In these circumstances, the issue of confidentiality is sometimes raised
as a concern about whether information from the process might be used in court should the
case be returned to the court. However, while this is an evidentiary question that should be
resolved, it is not fundamentally one of confidentiality. Unfortunately, confusion on this
issue leads some to assert that restorative justice processes should be confidential. Those who
make such claims are also sometimes influenced by the practice of protecting confidentiality
in civil alternative dispute resolution processes. However, those processes are significantly
different from restorative justice processes. They are aimed at the private settlement of a
private legal claim.
The logic of confidentiality in such circumstances is that one is more likely to reach a deal
in secret. That may be fine if the goal is to settle or reach a deal, but that is not the ambition
of restorative justice. Restorative processes have a substantive justice goal of the restoration
of relationships and their focus is primarily on the social relationships (narrowly and broadly
understood) involved in the situation and not centrally concerned with the personal/intimate
relationships between specific parties. This goal cannot be served by private justice —
restorative justice is inherently about public justice and it is thus important that restorative
justice processes be kept public. Court proceedings are public for these very same reasons.
It is important that justice be done and be seen to be done; in the seeing of it, societal values
and the commitment to justice are affirmed. Of course, there will be exceptions where there
may be some significant harm caused by a public process or where the public may have to
take a limited role if the demand to participate is overwhelming, and these exceptions could
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also be made under similar circumstances in restorative justice processes.42 But even in these
cases, efforts should be made to, if possible, make the outcome agreement or relevant
information about the direction and outcome of the process publicly accessible.
It will also be important to consider what should happen if certain parties, who are clearly
centrally affected by the event, do not wish to take part. Should their refusal serve as a veto
on the process? There are some serious issues to consider in terms of fair treatment if access
to a justice process is at the mercy of another involved party. However, a restorative
approach does provide some explanation for why and how a process might proceed even
without all of the parties. Quite simply, a restorative approach reveals that there is more than
one relationship or set of relationships generally affected in a case. For example, even if the
family of the person who died does not wish to take part, there might still be harms
experienced by the accused's family, community, or the broader society that need to be
addressed. In a case of euthanasia, the health care professionals involved in the case as well
as other health care professionals in the same facility might have been greatly affected.
Finally, it will be essential in the context of euthanasia and assisted suicide that the
caseworkers, facilitators, and others involved in implementing such an approach receive
good training in the issues related to euthanasia and assisted suicide. In part, this is so that
they can be alert to the issues as they present themselves and ensure that the parties and the
process are prepared to handle them. However, it is also important in order to address the
stigma, prejudice, and other assumptions they might have regarding the issues involved.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the end, we can see that taking a restorative justice approach to euthanasia and assisted
suicide might provide us with a path away from intractable discord toward compassionate
compromise. By taking a restorative justice approach, euthanasia and assisted suicide remain
illegal and there is a clear statement being made by society that it believes they should be
avoided. However, the approach compels us to look at all of the factors involved in the
decision to seek and provide euthanasia or assisted suicide. It allows us to find that, in some
circumstances, euthanasia or assisted suicide are entirely inappropriate, the person who died
was harmed, and the social fabric was ruptured. It also allows us to find that, in other
circumstances, euthanasia or assisted suicide are a reasonable response to an unreasonable
situation, the person who died was not harmed, and ruptures in the social fabric were causes
rather than consequences of the unreasonableness of the situation. The appropriate response
in the former situation may be a finding of responsibility and a call for accountability from
the person who provided the assistance in dying. The appropriate response in the latter
situation may be to provide grief counselling and support to the family and friends of the
person who died and to call for changes to the aspects of the health care system that allowed
the person's situation to be such that their life was no longer worth living to them. A
restorative justice approach opens our eyes so that we take more into consideration, it opens
doors so that more individuals and organizations affected by the situation are engaged, and

Note in these cases though that this is valuable information for the state to consider, which perhaps
demonstrates that it is an issue about which a broader, more public process should take place outside the
confines of a particular case. For example, an inquiry process could be used (but one structured
restoratively).
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it opens the possibilities for ways in which to respond so as to ensure that we have a system
built upon relationships of equal respect, concern, and dignity.

